Cultural Studies Open Seminar, Spring ~ Summer 2005

Professors David Ewick and Modjtaba Sadria

NB: Unlike other course pages here, the weekly summaries of the activities of the Cultural Studies Open Seminar are prepared by students of the seminar and not by the instructors.

July 16: The Challenge of “Slow Life” in Japan, introduced by Hiroshi Ishiwata

Awaiting student summary.

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July 9: Guest lecture, Mr. Ilhan Niaz, Department of History, Quaid-I-Azam University, Culture of Power: Its Meaning and Evolution

Rather than posting a summary of Ilhan Niaz’s wonderfully-delivered, wide-ranging, and provocative lecture, we’ll await with great anticipation the publication of Culture of Power, due later this year from Oxford University Press.

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July 2: The Self-Destructive Logic of Japanese Communication, introduced by Yoshihide Tabuchi, abstract here, notes by guest attendee Mr. Atsushi Kobayashi.

YT modeled two “kinds of communication,” “Western” and “Eastern”:

Western: Mr. A —> Ms. B (one-way arrow, Mr. A communicates himself to Ms. B);

Eastern: Mr. A <—> Ms. B (double arrow, Mr. A decides what Ms. B thinks, Ms. B decides what Mr. A thinks, both in “sympathy”).

The following comments were made about this: 1) the “sympathetic mode” of communication exists everywhere, not just in the “East” or Japan; it has to do with a shared context or a relationship of intimacy (the “intimate other”); 2) from the nineteenth century to 1945, Japan spoke to the world; since 1945 it has stopped speaking to the world; 3) this was attributed to “the political economy of laziness” and “cost prevention”; this topic may be thought of in terms of pre-modern and modern organization of states; in Japan (and elsewhere) we are not taught to listen; our capacity for listening must be expanded if we are to be able to speak to the world.

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We are pleased to announce that in the July 9 seminar we shall be joined by Ilhan Niaz, Department of History, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad. He will speak on “The Culture of Power: Its Meaning and Evolution.”

Ilhan Niaz’s primary research interests are in the cultures of power in South and East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. His recent publications include “National Interest as the Determinant of Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” National Development and Security 11.2 (2003); “François Bernier’s Encounters with Oriental Despotism,” Pakistan Journal of History & Culture 25.1 (2004); and “The Taliban and the National Security Policy of Pakistan,” Pakistan Journal of History & Culture 25.1 (2004).

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June 25: No seminar meeting. Following is the abstract for Yoshihide Tabuchi’s introduction to “The Self-Destructive Logic of Japanese Communication,” with which the seminar will begin in the meeting of July 2.

Yoshihide Tabuchi, The Self-Destructive Logic of Japanese Communication (abstract):

I think one of the most important challenges of Japanese culture is the self-destructive logic of Japanese communication. In the May 7 seminar, Professor Ewick suggested that in many ways Japan is “absent” in the world, and asked, “why?” I may answer that this is because Japan and Japanese people rely upon what might be called a “logic of communication” that is the complete opposite of, say, the Western logic. (Please don’t ask what I mean by “Western.” [Note from DE: No way! I reserve my right to ask!])

In my understanding, the Western logic of communication is based upon a “send-send” relation. One is expected to send information to the others, and others are expected to do the same in return. But in Japan, I guess that the logic should be different. The Japanese logic of communication should be based upon a “sympathize-sympathize” relation. One is expected to give careful consideration to the others’ feeling, and the others are expected to do the same. In this logic, one does not have to say anything about him / herself because the others are supposed to know. Japanese phrases such as omonbakaru or omoi wo itasu clearly show this “sympathize-sympathize” characteristic of Japanese communication. The Japanese custom of so-called nemawashi also demonstrates this logic. Moreover, thinking about the historical perspective of the Japanese honne-tatemae habit, this has been reproduced because people can expect others to consider their honne behind tatemae. In short, we are expected to go out of ourselves to receive the messages of another, but NOT to send “our” own messages.

But the problem is that in the contemporary international society, this logic of communication is self-destructive. In my point of view, the international logic of communication is totally dominated by the Western logic of “send-send” relations. Therefore, Japan is also expected to send its information to the other states. If this fails, they simply recognize that Japan has nothing to say, or is perhaps a nation of deaf-mutes. This could be disastrous to Japan. But, of course, it does not necessarily mean that Japan has to give up its culture. If things are that simple, I could never call this a “challenge of Japanese culture.” I would like to start arguments by asking how we can function in the international society while at the same time maintaining our logic of communication.

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June 18: Korean Culture in Japan, introduced by Lenna Tamura, summary by Yuko Fukata.

LT made a presentation largely about the impact on Japanese society of the Korean soap opera, Winter Sonata. Winter Sonata was introduced in Japan by NHK in April 2003, and received tremendous attention, particularly among housewives. According to LT, the Winter Sonata phenomenon in Japan has influenced Japanese consciousness in three ways: 1) The drama influenced housewives in such a way that they became better able to express their desires. They talked openly about what and whom they liked, chatted with other drama viewers, and many actually travelled to Korea, where the drama was set. Fans also extended their interests not only to other soap operas and actors, but also to such artefacts of Korean culture as language and food. 2) The phenomenon also changed their husbands. By watching the drama together with their wives, husbands started to become more talkative at home. With increased dialogue, husbands came better to understand andto respect what their wives wanted to do. 3) Finally, the wave also influenced single women. Japanese women saw in the Korean dramas much that they liked about Korean men, and by comparison became more critical of Japanese men. Some went to Korea to try to find partners. The younger generation in Japan also became interested in Korean culture. The number of people who study Korean has increased, and Korean restaurants in Japan are filled with many patrons.

Discussion after LT’s introductiom was contentious. Some in the room took a political view of the Winter Sonata phenomenon, and one noted that a change in Japanese government policy to import more of Korean culture in Japan was intended to set in motion a reverse cultural flow of Japanese culture into South Korea. It was also noted that the Korean government had succeeded in selling an image of Korea that reminded Japanese nostalgically of the Japan of the 1940s and 1950s. Another argued that the impact of Korean culture in Japan is great, and that Japan has not experienced such an influx of foreign culture since the earlier incorporation of cultural artefacts from the United States.

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The Challenge of English to Japanese Culture, introduced by Etsuji Furukawa, summary by Yuko Fukata.

EF made a presentation that raised questions about English education in Japanese schools. According to EF, English education in Japan can be seen in both positive and negative ways. The positive aspect is that people can use English in an instrumental way, as a basic ability to communicate with many people in the world, or as an advantage in employment. EF’s examples of negative aspects were related in part to so-called “Americanization,” and also to the possible of decline of Japanese spiritual values.

Discussion following EF’s introduction, as with the earlier presentation, was contentious. One noted the degree to which Japan tries to take advantage of the English language by using it as an instrument, but that English is denied in Japan for reasons that have to do with an essentialized “Japaneseness.” This may be the reason that English education in Japan emphasizes grammar and vocabulary instead of communicative uses. Another seminar participant noted the degree to which English in Japan is associated with White Americans and, to a somewhat lesser extent, to White Britons, in spite of the fact that by far most English speakers in the world are neither White nor American or British. In contrast to Japanese uses of English that emphasize Japaneseness and arguably strengthen nationalism, outside of Japan English is used in pragmatic ways. People in the class seemed to know that one point of importance in knowing English is that so many scholarly papers become accessible, and one of the professors pointed out that English is a powerful tool in the criticism of power relations. This led to a turn to questions of linguistic power relations, but we ran out of time before solid conclusions about this were reached.

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June 11: Where is Art in Japanese Culture?, introduced by Yuko Fukata, summary by Kaori Omori.

YF made an interesting presentation about the ways the popularization of contemporary art challenges the relation between people and art. The main points of her argument were that 1) contemporary art is becoming more popular, and 2) art is getting closer to daily life (and therefore has become a challenge to the traditional Japanese ideas both of art and of art museums).

With the chart above, YF explained that art has been recognized as something that happens outside of daily life. She mentioned that we often associate the word “art” with, for example, European masterpieces. Then she provided us an example of the great success of a contemporary art exhibition held at the new Mori Art Museum in Roppongi Hills, Tokyo, which was visited by 500,000 people. What we find from the example is that the distance between art and daily life is lessening, because of contemporary art and contemporary understandings of ways of displaying art. Also YF mentioned the policies of the Mori Art Museum and the Setagaya Art Museum, the former of which tries to “bring art to daily life and to open it up to everyone,” the latter to “make art closer to us.”

Traditionally in Japan, an art museum has been recognized as a “special” place. In contrast to special exhibitions of traditional arts or “high art” (a Van Gogh exhibition, for example), which often in Tokyo attract tens of thousands of visitors, permanent exhibitions do not draw many visitors. Although what the Mori Museum presented was not traditional art such as European masterpieces, the exhibitions have been a great success, and in this way have challenged the traditional idea of art and art museums in Japan.

After the presentation many questions arose, such as “What is the definition of art?” and “Why is the sense of art so special?” The most exciting part of our discussion, however, was brought by the question, “Do museums soften our social relations?” We discussed the role of museum as public space, and the degree to which it may ease social tensions. Led by the comparison of karaoke parlors with museums, we further discussed time consumption and cultural consumption, and the strong cultural influence behind the ways we interact with time and with the public spaces around us.

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Housing Styles and Japanese Lifestyles, introduced by Suzuki Kaori, summary by Kaori Omori.

SK introduced the appealing idea of contemporary Japanese housing as a challenge to Japanese culture. She defined houses and apartments which were built after the Second World War as “traditional” Japanese housing, and compared these to contemporary housing.

With the chart above, SK stressed that this change in the use of space represents a change of Japanese people’s attitudes toward privacy. In contrast to “uncommunicative” “traditional” Japanese housing, some contemporary housing emphasizes its openness by means of the effective use of glass or non-divided floor designs. SK pointed out that although these contemporary housing designs have solved some of the problems of traditional housing, they have provoked arguments about ways to manage both security and openness, and also have raised questions about the nature of modern privacy.

This presentation led to an exciting discussion about both our senses of privacy and our senses of individuality. Several students pointed out that the features of the “challenging” new housing designs are similar to old (pre-war) types of Japanese houses, which were characterized by an expansive use of space. KS insisted that what is most fascinating is the difference between pre-war housing and contemporary housing, although she agreed that they share some common attributes in their use of space. Her point was in part that the older type of housing was built before clear concepts of privacy and individuality had emerged in Japan, while people choosing contemporary housing of the type she discussed know well about the concepts of privacy and individuality, and intentionally choose the openness of their designs with these in mind.

This impressive introduction made us think about people’s attitudes toward privacy from the point of view of the changing uses of space, and considerably intrigued the members of the class.

Image: Edward S. Morse, “The Openness of the Japanese House,” illustration from Morse’s Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings, 1st edition, 1885.

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Following are Suzuki Kaori’s introductory notes for this discussion:

The title of my presentation is “Housing Styles and Japanese Lifestyles.” It is based in part on a recent NHK television program (the title of which I cannot remember) about people living in apartment buildings and architectural challenges to keep a sense of openness in the neighborhood. I’m also drawing on a course I took as an undergraduate, in which the Professor of Architecture made similar points about the ways architects approach some projects. My idea is that architecture itself has a hand in constructing human relations, and I think this is a very interesting concept.

What is “traditional Japanese housing” and “challenging Japanese housing”? I’d like to define “traditional” housing here as referring to houses and apartment buildings in the city which were made after the Second World War. These are the majority of houses and apartments that we see (and live in) in contemporary Japanese society. Among the characteristics of this kind of housing are that it overemphasizse privacy and the importance of private rooms, and places too much emphasis on the importance of facing the South. As a result of these and other attributes we can say that these houses and apartments are “uncommunicative.”

Suzuki Shigehumi, who has done research about apartment buildings, notes this uncommunicative-ness. He argues that contemporary houses overemphasize privacy and private rooms, and suggests that new houses should open themselves to the society and demonstrate their atmosphere and life to the outside. This is important, Suzuki argues, both for the community and for the security of neighborhoods. [NB: KS’s source for this material on Suzuki is Ohoka (see below); a .pdf of the Suzuki article to which Ohoka refers may be downloaded by clicking here.]

Ohoka Toshiaki points out the problem of attaching too much importance to the South. [A .pdf of Ohoka’s article is here.] His focus is houses, not apartment buildings. He says that the modern houses of the samurai did not attach much importance to the South, but rather turned the front of the house to the road and therefore to the society itself. Today, however, often the back of the house faces the road, because people believe that living rooms and other important rooms in the house should face the South. South-facing rooms are also a selling point of apartments in the Japanese real estate business.

What I am calling “challenging Japanese housing” criticizes the overemphasis on privacy and private rooms in traditional post-war Japanese houses and apartments. Some contemporary apartment designers do this by making innovative use of glass and windows. The NHK program mentioned one designer who has made the door of his apartment of glass, and an illustrator who has made his work-room so that it can be seen from the outside as a gallery. The house proposed by Esumi Toshinori has no single private room [.pdf (in Japanese) here]. The bedroom and other spaces are not privatized. Family members are not isolated, and are able to use all the spaces of the house freely.

These new paradigms raise difficult questions, not least about the ways to balance security and openness. Human relations within a neighborhood are of course good for security, but at the same time, people outsideknowing who lives in a particular dwelling may pose risks, especially perhaps for women who live alone. Questions also might be raised about privacy, and the degree to which it can be moderated. Overemphasizing privacy no doubt damages human relations, but of course some degree of privacy is necessary.

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June 4: The Digital Camera as a Challenge to Japanese Culture, introduced by Hiroaki Furihata, summary by Etsuji Furukawa.

HF provided an interesting introduction to “The Digital Camera as a Challenge to Japanese Culture.” Following are the main points of the introduction, as based on the HF handout:

1. Development and Growing Popularity of Digital Culture

1995: Kodak DC10 380K pixel ¥99,800, Richo DC-1 410K pixel ¥149,000;
2004: Kodak LS743 Zoom 4230K pixel ¥29,900, Richo RR330 3140k pixel, ¥22,000;
today even mobile phones are equipped with a digital camera.

2. Challenges to Japanese Publishing Culture

Traditional publishing culture: time-lag, paper based, company based; challenge 1: Time / Quickness: film camera—2 to 3 hours in development before sending for publication; digital camera—no time-lag; challenge 2: Virtuality: digital display on PC, even on mobile phone; challenge 3: Ease of Use: ordinary people increasingly use digital photography for publishing newsletters, magazines or books, both paper and web-site based.

After HF’s introduction, many questions arose and the argument was extended in various directions. Among the questions raised were: 1) While the digital camera has increased visual communication, has it led to a decrease in verbal communication? 2) To what degree has the digital camera led to a de-mystification of publishing? 3) To what degree have photographs come to replace memory? The most impressive part of the discussion was about the relation of digital cameras, digital publication, and social movements. We discussed the recent publication of and reaction to the photographs from Abu Ghraib, and the recent photograph, not published in the mainstream Japanese press, of the self-immolation of a Korean man in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. We discussed further the possibility that digital photography and digital publication has led to a de-mystification of the relation of citizens and power.

Image: “I Am a Camera,” from Steve Mann’s Keynote Address at the McLuhan Symposium on Culture and Technology, 1998, wearcam.org.

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May 28: The Impact of the J-League on Japanese Culture, introduced by Masafumi Tanaka, summary by Yoshihide Tabuchi.

MT made an impressive presentation about a contemporary challenge to Japanese culture. He compared the Japanese Professional Football League, the so-called J-League, to the Japanese Professional Baseball League, and argued that J-League could be understood as challenging tradition or establishing itself as an alternative sports culture in contemporary Japan. According to MT, J-League and professional baseball differ in several important ways:

MT argued that the ideas represented in this chart show that J-League has had much more of a grass-roots influence in Japan than professional baseball. This grass-roots popularity of J-League, MT suggested, has produced a sense of crisis within professional baseball, and has helped in its institutional reconstruction.

While the floor agreed with MT’s observations, important critical comment was made by the two professors of the class, who noted that the grass-roots popularity of J-League could be understood to be producing a conscious / unconscious construction of nationalism. This observation from different angles suggested to us the possibility of the instrumental use of J-League to generate homogenous nationalism. For example, the World Cup Games are always headlined, according to the nations competing, in an exaggerated way. Moreover, foreign players in J-League can expect streamlined treatment if they want to get Japanese nationality. All these facts imply the danger of a “discipline society.” Therefore, we must be conscious of this negative possibility of J-League, as well as celebrating its positive influences.

Image source: soccerphile.com.

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May 21: Awaiting student summary.

Beginning in the May 28 seminar meeting we shall focus on student-selected topics and student-led discussions that have grown from the earlier discussions of the seminar. The topic to be addressed is “a challenge to Japanese culture.” The schedule for the remainder of this term is as follows:

May 28: Masafumi Tanaka, The Impact of the J-League on Japanese Culture

June 4: Hiroaki Furihata, The Digital Camera as a Challenge to Japanese Culture

June 11: Yuko Fukata, Where is Art in Japanese Culture?; Suzuki Kaori, Housing Styles and Japanese Lifestyles

June 18: Lenna Tamura, Korean Culture in Japan; Etsuji Furukawa, The Challenge of English to Japanese Culture

June 25: No seminar meeting

July 2: Yoshihide Tabuchi, The Self-Destructive Logic of Japanese Communication

July 16: Hiroshi Ishiwata, The Challenge of “Slow Life” in Japan

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May 14: Guest lecture, Dr. Millie Creighton, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Cultural Representations of Canada in Japan

Abstract: This presentation builds on previous work done on representations of foreigners and foreign places in Japan, to explore the representations of a particular foreign country, Canada, showing its particular image in the Japanese mindscape compared to other western countries. The presentation explores two, Anne of Green Gables, known in Japan as “Carrot Head Anne,” and a popular Canadian advertising figure, known as the one-eyed wilderness adventurer, or “the Man with the Patch.” Prince Edward Island, home of Anne Shirley, and the Yukon territory, furusato (home community) of the wilderness adventurer, become central images of Canada replicated in Japan for a general image of the great open wilderness and small town community life. Research done in Japan is presented, on the advertising talent who has lived there over 30 years, and on tourism in Japan to Canadian World in Hokkaido, a theme park replicating Prince Edward Island of the Anne story. Research is also presented on Japanese tourism to Canada sparked by an interest in these two figures and places. Findings show younger Japanese have different available networks than before, and reveal how sharing information by internet allows them to embed themselves for relatively long periods of time (six months or more) in what to them are the fictive communities of Carrot Head Anne at Cavendish, P.E.I., or the Canadian one-eyed wilderness adventurer in the Yukon, contrasting this with how the phenomenon of arriving Japanese youth is perceived by local Canadians for whom these are real communities. The analysis suggests deep connections between associations of “place” and “time” and looks at how these are linked to issues of identity. The appeal of these landscapes, is partly that they represent the “foreign,” “outer world,” and represent “Canada” as a contrasting foreign/western image to the pervasive United States. However, the paper also suggests the reverse: a big part of the appeal is that through the venue of nostalgic journeys into these “foreign” landscapes Japanese attempt to deal with their own contemporary sense of loss, homelessness, nostalgia for a severed furusato, receding natural environment and vanishing cultural identity.

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May 7: How does alternative Japanese knowledge construction find representation outside of Japan?, summary by Hiroshi Ishiwata.

Following the former lectures, this discussion on Saturday May 7 started from the questions of Professor Ewick: Accepting that we have alternative grassroots networking in Japan, and a certain number of people who eloquently represent (internally) a critical attitude toward contemporary Japanese society, how can such groups or people successfully represent their information / knowledge externally, outside of Japan? And if they cannot, what problems are the result?

In order to understand the context of these questions, a comparison between the United States and Japan provided an adequate example. On the one hand, generally speaking, regardless of Japanese media or other media, we have in Japan alternative information circuits which disapprove of the policies of United States, even though the government tries to control information. On the other hand, in the case of Japan, as the former lectures suggested, the stereotyped and nationalist images of Japan continue to be those represented abroad. There seem to be no alternative images. It is Ishihara Shintarô and not Oe Kenzaburô, never mind the students of this seminar, whose representations are available, even unavoidable, in a non-Japanese context.

One probable answer to Professor Ewick’s questions is that Japanese alternative movements cannot represent themselves well abroad. About this answer, there was an argument in the classroom about whether the distinctiveness of Japanese culture is a crucial factor of difficulty in this representation or attempt at representation. That is, there may be a distinctiveness of Japanese culture that involves not showing oneself well, and which makes it difficult for Japanese to represent themselves to the outside world.

According to Professor Sadria, this culture consists of two specific characteristics. First, the Japanese communication mode has its own particularity. In this mode, the receiver of communication has the responsibility of communication; therefore, the quality and logic of the message generated by the sender does not come to be an issue. Consequently, this logic makes the cross-referentiality between Japanese and others difficult. Second, the attitude of conflict-avoidance among Japanese is also a substantial problem. In stereotyped images of Japan—Nipponjin-ron, for instance—Japan is represented as a “vertical society,” or a group-oriented society. According to Professor Sadria, this is not only a representation: Japanese society embodies these images. Even though active social movements and organizations exist in Japan, it is rare to talk about politics in everyday life. Furthermore, political apathy is strong, and perhaps increasing, in this society.

In conclusion, the answers to Professor Ewick’s questions seem to be negative. Considering the conditions of Japanese society, still the creation of alternative information circuits that can find representation in the outside world is difficult. In order to achieve the goal of overcoming this situation, analysis of Japanese socialization processes, which in part construct our specific communication mode and the cultural attitudes that pertain in Japanese society, must be a critical first step.

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April 30: Awaiting student summary.

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April 23: Japanese Representations and Representations of Japan in the World, summary by Hiroaki Furihata.

We began with the question of whether Japan is able to represent an independent view toward the Middle East. There were two positions toward this question. One presented a doubt that Japan could represent an independent view because Japanese consciousness toward the Middle East is deeply influenced by images in the Japanese media, which transmits news and information largely derivative of media in the United States. Many Japanese news images about the war in Iraq were derived from news reporters “embedded” with the US military, whose reports were subject to military censorship. Thus, those who adopted this position suggested that it is difficult for Japan to represent an independent view toward the Middle East.

The other position in the seminar was that Japan is able to represent a specifically “Japanese” point of view toward the Middle East. One supportive argument for this position addressed growing grass-roots interactions between Japan and the Middle East. Due to the increase of travel to the Middle East, many ordinary Japanese people have received information and knowledge there through direct interactions. What these travelers experience in Middle Eastern societies differs from media representations in Japan. Thus, if this grass-roots information and knowledge is able to spread, it would become possible that in Japan an endogenous view of the Middle East could be shaped.

Another supportive argument to explain this position was presented by Professor Sadria. According to Professor Sadria, several examples illustrate the existence of independent views in Japanese society toward the Middle East. The first example was that grass-roots interactions between Japanese intellectuals and at least some Middle Eastern societies have been going on for some time. The Japanese scholars who organized the Japan Association for Middle East Studies (JAMES) have been doing their utmost to help to create a critical perspective on the Middle East in Japan. Furthermore, the creation of the Asian Federation of Middle Eastern Studies Associations (AFMA) by scholars from Japan, Korea, and China is another attempt to enlarge East Asian scholarly concerns toward the Middle East, somehow specific, and diverse from the main views existing in the United States. Japanese scholars also have contributed to the writing of high school textbooks that provide more balanced information about the Middle East to students.

The next example was the possibility of the expression of views in the Japanese mass media that are critical of American policy toward the Middle East. During the invasion of Iraq, the Japanese media invited critical commentators to television programs and allowed a limited open critique of US policy. This was an indication that the Japanese media can and sometimes do have a different view of the Middle East than that of the United States.

The last example presented by Professor Sadria about an autonomous view of Japanese society toward the Middle East was based on the narrower interests perceived and defined by some Japanese policy makers. The specific case he mentioned was the attitude of the Japanese government at the time of the so-called “oil shock” of 1973-74. When Henry Kissinger visited Japan soon after the oil shock, the Japanese government requested that he encourage the US government to guarantee oil at an affordable price for Japan. But Kissinger rejected this request. Soon after, the Japanese government officially recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and soon some of the social side effects of the oil shock, the famous “toilet paper crisis,” for example, were gone. This episode suggested that the Japanese government had its own view and was able to express its own interests toward the Middle East, and decided specific foreign policy based upon these. As these examples demonstrate, it is possible to say that in Japanese society there are many specific views toward the Middle East that are not dependent upon representations from the West.

In the continuation of the discussion about the content of representations of the Middle East and the world in Japan, we shifted the focus to the ways Japan has been represented in the world. Some, such as the speakers in the ambassadorial lectures of the first two weeks of the International Policy Studies Forum, represent Japan as a role model of the success of a non-Western country, able at the same time both to modernize and to keep its own cultural identity. We considered whether Japan could only be represented in this way. On this topic, Professor Sadria and Professor Ewick presented examples of ways that Japan was represented in the past. They mentioned the early twentieth century, when (as now) Japan often was represented as the role model of a successful non-Western country, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Professor Ewick mentioned, for example, the British socialist Henry Hyndmann, who in his journal Justice “rejoice[d]” at the “Great Historic Event” of the Japanese victory at Port Arthur,

because from one end of India to the other [the] . . . triumph will give the natives the fullest assurance that if they have even a tenth the pluck of the islanders of the Land of the Rising Sun, the days of English bloodsucking and famine-manufacture are coming to an end (“A Great Historic Event,” Justice, Jan. 7, 1905, p. 1).

According to Professor Sadria and Professor Ewick, several historical events influenced representations of Japan in this period. Those mentioned included the following:

1) In 1901, Britain asked the Meiji government to send troops to China to help suppress the Boxer Rebellion. The response was 8,000-10,000 Japanese troops marching on Beijing, the largest contingent in the Allied Army that ended the anti-colonialist rebellion of the Boxers.

2) In 1902, the establishment of the Anglo-Japan Alliance gave Japan diplomatically an equal international status with Britain. Renewals of the Alliance in 1905 and 1911 included Japanese pledges to support Britain in the event of an anti-colonial uprising in India. During this period Japan also signed agreements to support French hegemony in Indo-China, Russian in Manchuria and Mongolia, and American in the Philippines, in return for acknowledgment of the legitimacy of Japanese claims to her own colonial territories, including Korea. Professor Ewick noted in this regard three items from the British press of the summer of 1910. The first was a quote from a Japanese diplomat commenting on the Japan-British Exhibition in London:

My people have been sending artistic treasures to Europe for some time, and were regarded as barbarians, but as soon as they showed themselves able to shoot down Russians with quick-firing guns they were acclaimed as a highly civilised race. (Quoted from The British Press and the Japan-British Exhibition, 1910).

The second and third were from the London Times of the same summer, which on August 25 noted on page 1 that “[H]is Majesty’s Government have been apprised of the intended [Japanese] annexation of Korea, to which there is no objection,” and matter-of-factly on August 29, also page 1, that “to-morrow the ancient Empire of Korea will cease to exist.”

It is often said that Japan should be a role model for non-Western countries, as Japan was perceived when it defeated Russia. But history tells us that representations of Japan in that period were not single, but plural. Some representations in this period even indicated that it was actually Europe, most specifically Britain, which supported Japan’s rise to international power. Professors Sadria and Ewick noted in this regard that the Japanese Navy that was instrumental to victory in the Russo-Japanese War was built in British shipyards, with strong financial backing from Washington. So, what do these representations about Japan imply in regard to recent voices that Japan should be a role model for non-Western countries?

About this question, one student in the class pointed out the similarity between the situation of Japan in the recent Iraq war and that in the period of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905: the United States has used Japan to bolster the occupation of Iraq as Britain used Japan to put down the Boxer Rebellion and to support the occupation of India. This analogy if carried through might suggest that Japan may again be a rising military power, which may again exercise military force to fulfill its interests.

Another student pointed out the difference of the contexts between the early twentieth century and the early twenty-first. While social consciousness of human rights and racial discrimination was under-developed in the early 1900s, such consciousness has been widely spread in the world of the early 2000s, and has fostered an autonomous and subjective attitudes among ordinary people. The autonomy of ordinary people—social autonomy—would in this view work as a preventative measure against military abuses. Thus, due to the change in social consciousness, according to this student, the situation of the early twentieth century may not be usefully compared to the current period.

There was, however, a counter argument that suggested the difficulty in the changing of establishment world views in comparison with those of ordinary people. For example, even after the conclusion of Anglo-Japan Alliance in 1902, representations of Japanese among some of the establishment of Britain were still racist. Professor Ewick provided another quote, the opening sentence of T. W. H. Crossland, The Truth About Japan, published in London by Grant Richards in 1904:

A stunted, lymphatic, yellow-faced heathen, with a mouthful of teeth three sizes too big . . . bulging slits where his eyes ought to be . . . a foolish giggle, a cruel heart, and the conceit of the devil—this, O bemused reader, is the authentic dearly-beloved ‘Little Jap’ . . . the fire-eater out of the Far East, and the ally, if you please, of John Bull, Esquire.

Similar to this, even though Japan has supported the United States in occupation of Iraq, the right wing American military ideology is very peculiar, and perhaps includes for some similar understandings of Japan and Japanese people. If this is true, even though the world views of general society have changed, those of reactionary members of hegemonic establishments do not change so quickly. Perhaps it is difficult to reject the possibility that in more ways than one the current trajectory of representations of Japan and of Japan itself have much in common with those of the early twentieth century.

What was added to this argument was the difficulty of the representation of the views of ordinary society. That is, the views of the elite establishment tend to be represented rather than the activities of ordinary people. Thus, even in the presence of active grass-root interactions or intellectual interactions such as those connected with JAMES as mentioned above, figures of the establishment such as Prime Minister Koizumi or Governor Ishihara are in Japan and in the world widely perceived and recognized as representing Japan.

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April 16: Representation and Discourse, summary by Hiroaki Furihata.

In the first week of the seminar, we discussed “representation” and “discourse”—two significant concepts in cultural studies. Dr. Sadria opened the discussion by questioning the familiar statement that “Japanese people do not have religion.” He explained his understanding that this statement is wrong about both the nature of religious beliefs and behavior in Japan, and is indication of a misunderstanding of the concept of religion itself. Rather than Japanese not being religious, one may see various religious behaviors on a daily basis. For example, before the entrance exams, many students go to a shrine and pray that they will pass the exam; many Japanese ritually say itadakimasu and gochisou-sama; when people buy new car, many of them also buy small omamori for safety; and parents take children to a shrine at birth, as well as at the ages of three, five, or seven. Considering popular and new religions in Japan would provide a stronger understanding of religiosity in Japan.

Based upon these examples it seems difficult to say that Japanese are not religious. With regard to this consideration, Dr. Sadria asked participants in the seminar whether they would agree with the statement that Japanese are “very religious people.”

Interestingly, responses from the class were not positive. The tendency in response to the question was to say, “yes, but . . .”. For example, some said “yes, Japanese people say itadakimasu, but this is custom and not religion.” Dr. Sadria, while contending that Japanese are pluralists about religion, pointed out that participants in this class had a very strong tendency of denial, a resistance to see religious beliefs or practices at work in the society. In other words, we were, in fact, articulating a negative representation and a standard Japanese discourse about religion.

“Representation” and “discourse” are two key concepts of cultural studies. From today’s responses about the question of religion in Japan, each of us in one way or another made a representation, and formulated a discourse about the place of religion in Japan. Almost without exception each of us is tempted to say that what we say is the reality, but we were producers and reproducers of a discourse on religion in Japan.

In short, whenever people qualify real phenomena, they are representing them according to their perceptions. In one way or another we are part of a process of producing and reproducing discourse and representation, which are bound by the context in which we are located. With a change of context, representation and discourse may also change.

According to Dr. Sadria, before 1945 there was no negative representation of religion in Japan, although some theoretical debates have always existed, as well as some use of religion by the state. After 1945, the negative representation and discourse of religion appeared in the shadow of the idea of separation of state (politics) and religion. Thus, it could be considered that representation and discourse in Japan were negatively defined by politics for the purpose of legitimatizing a separation between state and religion. Other examples of changing representations were added to enlarge the scope of the discussion of the key concepts of discourse and representation beyond the case of religion.

Dr. Ewick also added examples of the binding of representation and discourse by context. He mentioned different representations about the assassination of Indira Gandhi. When she was assassinated, many people represented her death from within particular contexts, and so of course as the context differed so did the nature of the representation.